Left Behind, and Then Pushed Out: Charting a Jurisprudential Framework to Remedy Illegal Student Exclusions by Rosborough, Davin
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 87 Issue 3 
January 2010 
Left Behind, and Then Pushed Out: Charting a Jurisprudential 
Framework to Remedy Illegal Student Exclusions 
Davin Rosborough 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Education Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Davin Rosborough, Left Behind, and Then Pushed Out: Charting a Jurisprudential Framework to Remedy 
Illegal Student Exclusions, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 663 (2010). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss3/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
663 
LEFT BEHIND, AND THEN PUSHED OUT: 
CHARTING A JURISPRUDENTIAL FRAMEWORK 
TO REMEDY ILLEGAL STUDENT EXCLUSIONS 
―We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation 
when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills 
upon which our social order rests.‖1  
―In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected 
to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an 
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which 
must be made available to all on equal terms.‖2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the United States embarks on its first year with an African 
American President, African American and Latino students in many of our 
major cities still have less than a sixty percent chance of graduating from 
high school.
3
 The ―human cost‖ of these disparities on the nation as a 
whole and especially on these particular communities is immense, 
exacting a particular toll on the career and life prospects of those who do 
not graduate.
4
 Along with disproportionately high dropout rates, schools 
 
 
 1. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982). 
 2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 3. Of the student cohort scheduled to graduate during 2003–2004, only 57.8% of Latino 
students, 53.4% of Black students, and 49.3% of Native American students did, while only 45% of 
students graduated in New York and Los Angeles, approximately 35% in Baltimore and Cleveland, 
and 25% in Detroit. CHRISTOPHER B. SWANSON, EDITORIAL PROJECTS IN EDUC. RESEARCH CTR., 
CITIES IN CRISIS: A SPECIAL ANALYTIC REPORT ON HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION 1, 9, (2008), 
available at http://www.edweek.org/media/citiesincrisis040108.pdf. 
 4. Because it appears that the majority of pushed out students are unlikely to finish their high 
school education, most share the fate of dropouts: they are far more likely to be unemployed and earn 
low salaries, depend upon public assistance, experience poor health, and end up in prison. See GARY 
ORFIELD ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV. ET AL., LOSING OUR FUTURE: HOW 
MINORITY YOUTH ARE BEING LEFT BEHIND BY THE GRADUATION RATE CRISIS 6 (2004), available at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/dropouts/LosingOurFuture.pdf (―In 2001, the 
unemployment rate for dropouts 25 years old and over was almost 75 percent higher than for high 
school graduates—7.3 percent versus 4.2 percent. Approximately, two thirds of all state prison inmates 
have not completed high school.‖); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, THE BIG 
PAYOFF: EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND SYNTHETIC ESTIMATES OF WORK-LIFE EARNINGS 2 
(2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23-210.pdf (―Average earnings ranged 
from $18,900 for high school dropouts to $25,900 for high school graduates, $45,400 for college 
graduates, and $99,300 for workers with professional degrees.‖); Henry M. Levin, The Social Costs of 
Inadequate Education, Summary of Teachers College Symposium on Educational Equity 16 (2005), 
http://www.tc.columbia.edu/i/a/3082_socialcostsofinadequateEducation.pdf (citing evidence from 
Professor Peter Meunnig that dropouts will live on average nine-years fewer than high school 
graduates and ―have higher rates of cardiovascular illnesses, diabetes and other ailments,‖ and noting 
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across the country discipline and exclude African American and Latino 
students at rates far higher than white students, even in non-urban school 
districts.
5
 
Hidden amongst students who drop-out and are expelled are a third 
often neglected category of students: those who have been illegally 
―pushed out‖ of school. These students were neither properly expelled 
according to laws and regulations, nor did they voluntarily choose to end 
their education. Rather, they are students improperly told or encouraged 
by administrators to leave school for illegitimate reasons, often in 
violation of the law.
6
 Pushouts occur when administrators tell students that 
they either must or ―should‖ leave school because they are too far behind 
in credits to graduate, their test scores are too low, or they have missed too 
much school, when in fact they are legally allowed to stay in school.
7
 This 
―pushout syndrome‖8 is largely driven by administrators pressured by the 
No Child Left Behind Act and other test-based accountability measures to 
raise test scores, who exclude low-scoring and ―problem‖ students rather 
than addressing their educational needs.
9
 
 
 
that a ―65-year-old person with a high school diploma typically enjoys better health status than a 45-
year-old who dropped out in 10th grade‖). 
 5. See Brooke Grona, School Discipline: What Process Is Due? What Process Is Deserved?, 27 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 233, 241 (2000) (discussing a decade old study of Austin, Texas schools, which noted 
that even though 18% of the students were African-American and 37% were white, 36% of the 
African-American students had been suspended or expelled versus only 18% of white students); Floyd 
D. Weatherspoon, Racial Justice and Equity for African-American Males in the American Educational 
System: A Dream Forever Deferred, 29 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 19–22 (2006) (citing a study by the 
National Center for Education Statistics which found that in 1999, 35% of African American students 
in grades seven through twelve had been suspended or expelled at some point versus only 15% of 
white students); Howard Witt, School Discipline Harder on Blacks, CHI. TRIBUNE, Sept. 25, 2007, at 
C1; NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUC. FUND, INC., DISMANTLING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON 
PIPELINE, available at http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pipeline/Dismantling_the_School_to_ 
Prison_Pipeline.pdf (―[I]n 2000, African Americans represented only 17% of public school enrollment 
nationwide, but accounted for 34% of suspensions.‖). 
 6. ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN OF NEW YORK, SCHOOL PUSHOUT: WHERE ARE WE NOW? 
(2008), http://www.advocatesforchildren.org/pubs/pushout_update_2008.pdf; Baltimore City Public 
Schools, Student Services, Alternative Options Program Frequently Asked Questions, http://www. 
baltimorecityschools.org/Departments/Student_Support/PDF/FAQ.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2009); 
Statement, Dignity in Schools, Children Are Being Pushed Out of School, Dignity in Schools 
Campaign (2008), http://www.dignityinschools.org/summary.php?index=158 [hereinafter Dignity in 
Schools Campaign]. 
 7. ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 3 (describing ways students are pushed out); Dean Hill 
Rivkin, Legal Advocacy and Education Reform: Litigating School Exclusion, 75 TENN. L. REV. 265, 
277 (2008). 
 8. ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 3. 
 9. See James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 932, 969 (2004) (observing that the severe consequences for administrators whose schools fail to 
make ―adequate yearly progress‖ under the No Child Left Behind Act make school leaders in 
struggling schools keenly aware that ―[s]tudents who perform poorly on state tests obviously hurt 
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While dropouts are themselves a staggering problem, the pushout 
problem may be even more complex because students are usually pushed 
―out the back door‖10 and ―under the radar of effective accountability.‖11 
Thus, this already invidious practice is furthered by its invisibility to the 
public.
12
 Though the educational advocacy group Advocates for Children 
of New York (AFC) has recently had some success litigating against 
pushouts,
13
 this practice largely goes unnoticed by the public and 
unchallenged in the courts. The lack of pushout litigation may result 
largely from difficulty in discovering the problems, and the potential 
obstacles to proving that students were ―pushed out‖ rather than 
voluntarily dropping out.
14
 This ―pushout syndrome‖ certainly requires 
policy cures to address accountability measures gone awry, provide 
additional educational resources for struggling students, and create ―more 
powerful incentives for schools to ‗hold onto‘ students through graduation 
. . . .‖15 Regardless, litigation is needed to address the immediate effects of 
these devastating practices on ―minority youth who are already graduating 
at rates that are far lower than their white counterparts,‖16 to deter the 
practice in the future, and hopefully to spur reform.
17
 
 
 
schools looking to make AYP.‖ This creates a ―temptation‖ to ―push low performing students out. . . . 
This temptation [is] presumably . . . strongest at the high school level, both because students most 
typically drop out at this stage and because low-performing high school students are most likely to be 
farthest behind.‖); Maureen Carroll, Comment, Educating Expelled Students After No Child Left 
Behind: Mending an Incentive Structure That Discourages Alternative Education and Reinstatement, 
55 UCLA L. REV. 1909, 1929 (2008) (―By excluding low-scoring students, a school can improve its 
test scores without expending any additional resources.‖). 
 10. Rivkin, supra note 7, at 277. 
 11. ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 3. 
 12. Elisa Hyman, School Push-Outs: An Urban Case Study, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 684, 685 
(2005) (―Exclusionary practices have also flourished . . . due to faulty and nonuniform pupil-
accounting measures and a lack of standards of accountability for most alternative school programs.‖). 
 13. Id. at 688–89 (discussing New York City‘s settlement in two of three lawsuits filed by AFC, 
helping to reinstate improperly excluded students and address the problem in a variety of other ways). 
 14. Randee Waldman, a former senior attorney with AFC and co-counsel on the Franklin K. 
Lane High School pushout case, Ruiz v. Pedota, 321 F.2d 538 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), in response to the 
question of why more organizations have not taken up pushout litigation, said that in addition to some 
difficulties gathering evidence, pushout claims may often be hard to prove. Unlike the overwhelming 
evidence of blatantly illegal behavior available in the AFC pushout cases where students were given a 
―program card‖ noting their transfer to GED programs, other pushed out students may not have such 
strong objective evidence to make the case. Telephone Interview with Randee Waldman, Director, 
Barton Juvenile Defender Clinic, Emory Law School (Jan. 23, 2009). 
 15. ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 3. 
 16. Hyman, supra note 12, at 685. 
 17. See Alana Klein, Judging As Nudging: New Governance Approaches for the Enforcement of 
Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 351, 399–402 (2008) 
(noting the success of school finance litigation in Kentucky in prompting the State to pass sweeping 
educational reform measures); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How 
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1077 (2004) (noting that public law 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This Note addresses the pushout problem in the context of litigation, 
identifying different causes of action that courts should recognize as 
cognizable claims in pushout cases, as well as elements of effective 
remedies. Part II examines the pushout problem in greater depth, 
considering the history of the practice and its growth in recent years. 
Additionally, Part II looks at the root causes of pushouts, the reasons why 
the problem persists largely undetected, and the small amount of pushout 
litigation conducted thus far.
18
 Part III examines several causes of action 
as used in previous educational rights litigation, and analyzes each one‘s 
potential application to pushouts. Part III focuses most heavily upon both 
procedural and substantive due process challenges to school discipline, 
and federal and state equal protection claims, especially those challenging 
the equality or adequacy of school financing. 
Part IV recommends a legal framework under which courts considering 
pushout challenges should operate. In particular, it argues for a more 
expansive application of due process than is currently applied under Goss 
v. Lopez,
19
 recommends recognition of substantive due process claims, and 
asserts that pushouts also violate the Fourteenth Amendment under the 
equal protection rationale of Plyler v. Doe.
20
 Further, it suggests that due 
to the challenges inherent in public school litigation, courts should 
emphasize monitoring through the appointment of special masters, in 
addition to targeted injunctive remedies and compensatory measures. Part 
IV also addresses the problems of proving pushout claims and 
recommends student data reforms which are needed in order to better 
protect students from pushouts and to make such litigation more viable. 
II. PUSHOUTS: A BRIEF HISTORY AND THE PRESENT PROBLEM 
A. What is a Pushout? Changing Definitions, Similar Results 
Though the meaning of the term ―pushout‖ has changed somewhat 
from its origin in the late 1960s,
21
 the effects of the practice remain the 
 
 
litigation can, among other things, create publicity and focus attention on the problem, as well as 
motivating ―new stakeholders‖ to participate in reform efforts). 
 18. This litigation includes one case from the late 1960s and the ―trilogy‖ of cases litigated by 
AFC. See RV v. N.Y. City Dep‘t of Educ., 321 F. Supp. 2d 538 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Knight v. Bd. of 
Educ. of N.Y., 48 F.R.D. 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). 
 19. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
 20. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).  
 21. In the 1960s and 1970s, the term ―pushout‖ was used to refer to disciplinary procedures 
targeted at removing African-American students from recently integrated schools, as a form of 
resistance to school integration. See Antoine M. Garibaldi, Pushouts, African-American Students as, in 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss3/5
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same: primarily students of color are unfairly and often illegally denied 
their right to an education.
22
 The term ―pushout‖ has been imbued with 
racial overtones since its origin, when in the early 1970s African American 
students in recently integrated schools were targeted by white 
administrators for minor offenses and repeatedly suspended or expelled.
23
 
These pushed-out students may have appeared ―in the statistics as drop 
outs, expulsions or suspensions,‖ but were actually ―victims of 
discriminatory discipline procedures in public schools.‖24 
Students and parents successfully attacked this pushout practice in the 
Dallas school system in 1972 by filing a federal class action lawsuit 
challenging Dallas‘ suspension procedures on the basis of racial 
discrimination and the denial of equal protection as well as substantive and 
procedural due process.
25
 The court found that ―existing racism‖ was the 
―chief cause of the disproportionate number of Blacks being suspended,‖ 
and directed the school district to ―review its present program and to put 
 
 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN EDUCATION 374, 374–76 (Faustine C. Jones-Wilson et al. 
eds., 1996); Transcript of Options on Education, Pushouts: New Outcasts from Public School (NPR 
radio broadcast Sept. 9, 1974), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/ 
content_storage_01/0000019b/80/37/f7/88.pdf [hereinafter Pushouts: New Outcasts from Public 
School]. While disciplinary measures are sometimes still used as a tool to push students out, the range 
of techniques is wider, and the reasons are different, as the schools themselves often are made up 
primarily of African American or Latino students. More recently, pushouts have been classified as 
affecting students who are ―at-risk, or who will need extra years to graduate‖ or are low performing, 
who are ―encouraged‖ to leave regular high schools or counseled-out, discharged illegally, or 
prevented from attending schools at all. See PUB. ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF N.Y. & ADVOCATES 
FOR CHILDREN, PUSHING OUT AT-RISK STUDENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH SCHOOL DISCHARGE 
FIGURES 5–6 (2002), available at http://www.advocatesforchildren.org/pubs/2005/discharge.pdf 
[hereinafter Office of the Public Advocate]. 
 22. See Reginald T. Shuford, Why Affirmative Action Remains Essential in the Age of Obama, 31 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 503, 514–15 (2009). 
Whether meted out discipline at a disproportionate rate, assigned to failing schools, banished 
to disciplinary alternative schools, over-identified as special needs, denied educational 
services when accurately identified as special needs, subjected to high-stakes testing, or 
placed under zero-tolerance policies that criminalize minor infractions, students of color are 
pushed out of public schools . . . at an alarming rate. 
Id.; see also ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 26 n.8 (showing schools and students affected by 
pushouts are mostly African American); Lupe S. Salinas & Robert H. Kimball, The Equal Treatment 
of Unequals: Barriers Facing Latinos and the Poor in Texas Public Schools, 14 GEO. J. ON POVERTY 
L. & POL‘Y 215, 230 (2007); New York City Department of Education, Franklin K. Lane High School 
Register (Oct. 23, 2009), http://schools.nyc.gov/SchoolPortals/19/k420/AboutUs/statistics/register. 
 23. See Pushouts: New Outcasts from Public School, supra note 21, at 3 (summarizing findings 
in a report by the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial that ―in school systems that are under desegregation 
orders or have recently attempted desegregation there seems to be a dramatic rise in the suspension of 
black students‖); see also S. REG‘L COUNCIL & ROBERT F. KENNEDY MEM‘L, THE STUDENT 
PUSHOUT: VICTIM OF CONTINUED RESISTANCE TO DESEGREGATION (1974). 
 24. See Pushouts: New Outcasts from Public School, supra note 21, at 1. 
 25. Hawkins v. Coleman, 376 F. Supp. 1330, 1331 (N.D. Tex. 1974). 
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into effect an affirmative program aimed at materially lessening ‗white 
institutional racism‘ in the [Dallas Independent School District].‖26 While 
current pushouts may result less from a targeted racist animus and instead 
from a more passive form of racism, educational neglect, the result of this 
practice is largely the same: ―[s]everal years from now the non-graduates 
may show up on welfare roles, in unemployment offices, or in jail.‖27 
A 1969 case from New York City better reflects a current 
understanding of pushouts, though the term was not then used. In that 
case, students and their parents challenged an expulsion en masse from 
Franklin K. Lane High School.
28
 The plaintiffs claimed the school was 
improperly trying to relieve overcrowding when it expelled hundreds of 
students from its rolls by claiming they ―were absent 30 days or more 
during the present school year and . . . had maintained an unsatisfactory 
academic record in the Autumn [sic], 1968 semester.‖29 Several named 
plaintiffs disputed that they met this criteria, and the class as a whole 
claimed a violation of due process and equal protection by the 
expulsions.
30
 Judge Weinstein found a violation of due process and issued 
a preliminary injunction, ordering the school to reenroll the expelled 
students, and provide make-up classes and resources. He also ordered the 
creation of a special ―Masters Committee‖31 to further address the 
situation.
32
 
The current conception of pushouts shares some similarities with these 
examples from several decades ago. Notably, the practice still primarily 
affects students of color and results in their exclusion from school.
33
 As in 
 
 
 26. Id. at 1337–38. 
 27. Pushouts: New Outcasts from Public School, supra note 21, at 1. 
 28. Knight v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 48 F.R.D. 108, 110 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 109. 
 31. The ―Masters Committee of Educational Experts‖ was composed of three members: 
Chairman Dr. Richard Trent, Associate Professor of Education at Brooklyn College; a member 
appointed by plaintiffs, Dr. Mabel Smythe, High School Coordinator, New Lincoln School; and a 
member appointed by the defendants, Dr. Irving Anker, Assistant Superintendent of Schools, Board of 
Education of the City of New York. The committee was charged with hearing any complaints by 
members of the plaintiff class regarding non-compliance with the injunction. Knight v. Bd. of Educ., 
48 F.R.D. 115, 117–18 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).  
 32. Knight, 48 F.R.D. at 117–18. Interestingly, Judge Jack Weinstein, who heard this case, is the 
same judge who in 2004 heard lawsuits filed by AFC alleging that students were pushed out of three 
New York City schools. See Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government Of, By, and For 
the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 29 (2008) (referring 
to the students in the Knight case as ―pushed out of high schools because their teachers thought them 
too difficult to deal with‖). 
 33. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Judge Weinstein also aptly noted in his approval 
of class certification and settlement in the most recent New York City pushout case in 2008: 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss3/5
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the Dallas case, disciplinary exclusions are still the justification used for 
some pushouts.
34
 Most similarly, pressures on school administrators are 
still the root cause of their wrongful conduct, though these pressures are 
now likely caused more by high-stakes testing and the pressure on 
struggling schools to meet state and federal standards, than by a primarily 
racist animus.
35
 Thus, as desperate administrators react poorly to these 
pressures, the same urban students of color long ―left behind‖ 
educationally face yet another crisis: the reality of pushouts. 
B. A Growing National Problem 
While school administrators push students out using an array of 
academic and disciplinary explanations, or constructively push students 
out by limiting educational services and activities to which they are 
entitled,
36
 pushouts have several common components. First, the students 
affected do not leave school of their own full volition. Rather, they are 
formally or informally told to leave or are ―counseled‖ that they would be 
better served in another educational setting such as a General Equivalency 
Degree (GED) program.
37
 Second, regardless of the stated purpose, the 
administrator‘s reasons and methods for excluding the students are 
illegitimate and usually illegal.
38
 Finally, the discharged students and their 
 
 
―Defendants had to be aware of what all could literally see—that their practices and policies of 
exclusion primarily adversely affected African-Americans and Latinos.‖ D.S. ex. rel. S.S. v. New York 
City Dep‘t of Educ., 255 F.R.D. 59, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 34. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin & Jennifer Medina, To Cut Failure Rate, Schools Shed Students, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 31, 2003, at A1 (describing a student who was told she could no longer attend school 
because ―[s]he had been in one too many fights, and missed one too many classes‖); ADVOCATES FOR 
CHILDREN OF NEW YORK, supra note 6, at 1 (―School pushout can also occur when a school chooses 
to punish a student by repeatedly suspending him or her instead of attempting to address the 
problematic behavior . . . .‖). 
 35. See Hyman, supra note 12, at 684–85 (describing how pressures from No Child Left 
Behind‘s accountability measures and the New York State Board of Regents ―fuel‖ the pushout 
problem). Some argue that institutionalized racism has a role in the pushout and dropout trends. See 
Lindsay Perez Huber et al., Naming Racism: A Conceptual Look at Internalized Racism in U.S. 
Schools, 26 CHICANA/O-LATINA/O L. REV. 183, 201 (2006) (arguing that many students who appear to 
drop out of school are really pushed out, as they ―internalize the racism connected to teachers, 
curriculum and resources, which lead to the disengagement and alienation,‖ causing these students to 
―consciously or unconsciously believe that because of their racial background they will not be able to 
succeed in school and, as a result, do not continue their education‖). 
 36. See infra note 73 and accompanying text (students assigned shortened schedules, noncredit 
classes and warehoused in the school auditorium for much of the day). 
 37. See Hyman, supra note 12, at 684 (describing students who are told they cannot stay in 
school because they are too old, did not have enough credits, or were not on track to earn a diploma in 
four years); Rivkin, supra note 7, at 277 (―For example, a school administrator tells a student that her 
best option is to drop out and take the GED because she is behind in credits for graduation.‖). 
 38. ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN, supra note 6, at 1–2; Office of the Public Advocate, supra note 
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parents are often unaware of their educational rights and thus are left 
―stranded in an educational no-man‘s land.‖39 These pushouts are often 
motivated by a common underlying factor as well: ―test-based 
accountability for schools . . . provide[s] an incentive to push out low-
performing students.‖40 
1. Why Do Pushouts Occur? 
Recent school accountability measures, namely the federal No Child 
Left Behind Act (NCLB), have put increased pressure on schools to meet 
certain testing goals and make ―Adequate Yearly Progress‖ (AYP).41 
Failure to meet these AYP targets invokes severe consequences for the 
school and the administrators.
42
 Because students struggling academically 
will likely score poorly on high-stakes tests and drag down the scores of 
the school, some desperate administrators resort to pushing these students 
out.
43
 The relationship between graduation rates and high-stakes tests for 
 
 
21, at 5–7; see also Dignity in Schools Campaign, supra note 6 (―Pushout happens when youth are 
removed (or remove themselves) from a regular school setting as a result of policies and practices that 
discourage them from remaining in classrooms and on track to receive a regular diploma.‖ These 
practices include ―[e]ncouragement of low-performing, overage or under-credited students to transfer 
to a GED program or other alternative setting.‖). A prime example is the New York City students aged 
eighteen or younger and legally allowed to remain in school until age twenty-one, who are told they 
must leave school because they were behind academically. Hyman, supra note 12, at 684. 
 39. ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 3; see also ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN, supra note 6, at 3 
(finding that out of 113 students who were told to leave school and did, 62 did not know they could 
remain in school until age 21); Dignity in Schools Campaign, supra note 6 (noting ―[t]he exclusion of 
students and parents from the development and implementation of local school policies and 
disciplinary processes, as well as due process violations‖ as a practice encouraging pushouts). 
 40. Ryan, supra note 9, at 970. 
 41. NCLB was passed in 2001 as a renewal of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 
1965. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–6304, 6311 (2006). NCLB set a 
benchmark for achieving one hundred percent student proficiency in math and reading by 2014, 
whereby states must create a plan to require each school to show ―adequate yearly progress‖(AYP), 
mainly through standardized tests developed by the State. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2) (2006). 
 42. Schools that fail to make AYP for two consecutive years are placed on ―school 
improvement‖ status, opening up transfer and supplemental education service options to students. 20 
U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(A) (2006). The schools that still fail to make AYP for the next two years require 
―corrective action,‖ which may include replacement of the administration, takeover by the district, or 
organizational ―restructuring,‖ and schools that fail to make AYP in the fifth year may face closure or 
state takeover. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(7)-(8) (2006); see also Carroll, supra note 9, at 1927 (describing 
this process). 
 43. ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 11 (―The overwhelming focus of many states and school 
districts aiming to avoid test-driven accountability sanctions has led to increased reports across the 
nation of schools that ―push out‖ low achieving students in order to help raise their overall test 
scores.‖); Carroll, supra note 9, at 1929 (―By excluding low-scoring students, a school can improve its 
test scores without expending any additional resources.‖); Cheryl George, Non-Education in America: 
Gateway to Subsistence Living, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 243, 244 (2008) (―Rather than being 
termed a ‗failing‘ school due to low standardized test scores, many schools have enacted 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss3/5
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accountability purposes contributes directly to this perverse incentive 
structure.
44
  
Until recently, NCLB regulations required the inclusion of graduation 
rates as an ―academic indicator‖ in determining a school‘s AYP, but 
allowed states to set their own graduation rate goals and did not require 
improvement in graduation rates to meet AYP.
45
 Because NCLB 
regulations did not allow high graduation rates to compensate for low test 
scores, but failure to meet graduation rate targets harmed a school‘s ability 
to make AYP, the policy incentivized states to set fairly low graduation 
rate goals rather than be subject to penalties for failing to meet high 
goals.
46
 These low goals made it easier for schools to push students out 
with impunity because even if pushed-out students were counted as 
dropouts, this had little effect on AYP. The Department of Education has 
recently changed the policy to help create incentives for schools to focus 
more on graduation rates and demand more accountability, providing hope 
that one incentive to push students out may be minimized.
47
  
 
 
administrative provisions to push students out of school rather than retain them and have to report their 
low test scores.‖); Hyman, supra note 12, at 684–85; Ryan, supra note 9, at 969 (―One less student 
performing below the proficiency level increases the overall percentage of students who have hit that 
benchmark.‖). 
 44. See Carroll, supra note 9, at 1912–13 (noting that NCLB creates an incentive structure rooted 
in ―an accountability system that rewards schools for engaging in exclusionary practices‖). 
 45. See Daniel J. Losen, Graduation Rate Accountability under the No Child Left Behind Act and 
the Disparate Impact on Students of Color, in DROPOUTS IN AMERICA 41, 45 (Gary Orfield ed., 2004) 
(―[T]he administration‘s regulations made it so that yearly progress is required only on test scores. . . . 
[S]chools and districts need only set a fixed goal for graduation rates, and that goal . . . can be 
whatever it wants it to be . . . .‖) 
 46. See Ryan, supra note 9, at 970. 
 47. The changes make graduation rate goals more stringent in a couple of ways. First, they 
demand more accountability of states in setting the goals, requiring that in its ―Consolidated State 
Application Accountability Workbook‖ submitted to the Department of Education for approval, it 
must provide ―[a]n explanation of how the State‘s graduation rate goal represents the rate the State 
expects all high schools in the State to meet and how the State‘s targets demonstrate continuous and 
substantial improvement from the prior year toward meeting or exceeding the goal.‖ Improving the 
Academic Achievement of the Disadvantaged, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,436, 64,509 (Oct. 29, 2008) (to be 
codified at 34 C.F.R. § 200.19). Thus, the Secretary of Education is requiring more information in the 
approval process for the state rate. Second, while states formerly had greater latitude to determine how 
to calculate their state‘s graduation rate, the new rules require the state to move to a standardized 
―four-year adjusted cohort graduation rate‖ by the 2010–11 school year, which is calculated by taking 
the ―number of students who graduate in four years with a regular high school diploma divided by the 
number of students who form the adjusted cohort for that graduating class.‖ Id. at 64,508–09. 
Additionally, the new regulations require graduation rates to be disaggregated by subgroup (including 
racial groups), presumably helping create a disincentive to push-out students of color. Id. at 64,509. 
Previously, schools needed ―to be responsible for minority groups only on test scores, not for whether 
most black or Latino students in a school actually drop out.‖ Losen, supra note 45, at 46; see also 
Kathleen Kingsbury, No Dropouts Left Behind: New Rules on Grad Rates, TIME, Oct. 30, 2008, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1854758,00.html (―[I]n 2005, all 50 states 
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Further, the reporting requirements of the NCLB regulations provide an 
additional exclusionary incentive, as they require that schools not count 
students who were not enrolled for a ―full academic year‖ for AYP 
purposes.
48
 Schools can thereby avoid including low performing students 
in AYP statistics by pushing them out before the end of the academic 
year.
49
 These pushout incentives also disproportionately affect students of 
color, as NCLB requires AYP to be met for certain ―subgroups‖ including 
racial groups, and African American or Latino students statistically score 
disproportionately lower on these tests and are thus more pressured to 
leave.
50
 While the recent graduation rate changes by the Department of 
Education
51
 may help to discourage pushouts, other ―faulty and 
nonuniform pupil-accounting measures and a lack of standards of 
accountability‖ continue to obscure pushouts and enable their existence.52 
2. How Pushouts Go Unnoticed 
Part of the reason why pushouts are tolerated and escape widespread 
attention is that many school systems have reporting procedures that 
enable pushouts to be hidden, and accountability measures that fail to 
prevent the practice. The New York City Public Advocate found that in 
the 2000–2001 school year alone over 55,000 New York City students 
were ―discharged,‖ though the data was not broken down by type of 
discharge.
53
 These figures, along with a large increase of school-aged 
 
 
agreed to enact a uniform graduation rate, but only 16 eventually did. Now officials will require states 
to spell out how they will implement key elements of the federal law, formal plans that the Department 
of Education must approve.‖). 
 48. See 34 C.F.R. § 200.20(e)(2) (2008) (―In determining the AYP of a school, the State may not 
include students who were not enrolled in that school for a full academic year, as defined by the 
State.‖). 
 49. These requirements may result in ―nefarious activities‖ such as pushouts, because ―non-
reporting occurs for ‗push-out students‘ as well as those sent to alternative schools . . . .‖ Philip T.K. 
Daniel, No Child Left Behind: The Balm of Gilead Has Arrived in American Education, 206 ED. LAW. 
REP. 791, 808–09 (2006). Daniel further notes that African American and Hispanic students are 
suspended and expelled at much greater levels than whites. Id. at 809. 
 50. See 34 C.F.R. § 200.13(b)(7)(ii) (2008); Losen, supra note 45, at 41, 44 (―It is well 
established that students in these groups [racial and ethnic minorities, economically disadvantaged 
students, students with disabilities, and students with limited English proficiency] are 
disproportionately low achieving. . . . [Thus] students in these groups may be pressured to leave when 
test scores alone determine whether schools and districts are sanctioned.‖). 
 51. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 52. Hyman, supra note 12, at 685. 
 53. Office of the Public Advocate, supra note 21 (―‗[D]ischarges‘ are defined as students who 
left the public school system in New York City to enroll in another educational program or who 
outgrew the system at the age of 21.‖). Jonathan Kozol also explains how ―[t]housands of low-
performing students who had left school, or been pushed out of their schools, had been improperly 
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students reported in GED programs, and additional anecdotal evidence, 
suggest that many of these ―discharges‖ were actually pushouts.54 In Los 
Angeles, the school system appears to lose track of many students 
completely.
55
 A Los Angeles Times investigation of one high school there 
found that a number of students classified as transfers to other high 
schools had really just left their schools, and several of these students 
reported that they were asked to leave.
56
 The structure of this system 
provides an incentive for administrators to push students out, because even 
if the ―discharged‖ students enter GED programs in lieu of earning actual 
high school diplomas, schools are not forced to count these students as 
dropouts.
57
 
 
 
excluded from the dropout figures.‖ JONATHAN KOZOL, THE SHAME OF THE NATION 208 (2005). 
Kozol notes that school officials had ―concealed‖ the numbers of these students by ―labeling these 
pupils ‗discharged students,‘ which implied they had transferred to another school or else enrolled in 
an ‗equivalency program‘ even when there was no evidence for these assumptions.‖ Id. 
 54. See Daniel J. Losen, Challenging Racial Disparities: The Promise and Pitfalls of the No 
Child Left Behind Act‟s Race-Conscious Accountability, 47 HOW. L.J. 243, 292 (2004) (―[E]xperts 
who have examined the statistics and administrators of high school equivalency programs say that the 
number of ‗pushouts‘ seems to be growing, with students shunted out at ever-younger ages.‖) (internal 
quotations omitted); Office of the Public Advocate, supra note 21, at 6–7; Hyman, supra note 12, at 
685. Many of these students were coded as ―transferred to another educational setting,‖ a vague 
determination that might mean they were pushed into an alternative education setting such as a GED 
program. Lewin & Medina, supra note 34. 
 55. See Mitchell Landsberg, Back to Basics: Why Does High School Fail So Many?, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 29, 2006, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/la-me-dropout29jan29,0, 
4040539.story (noting attempts by the Los Angeles Times to track students at one Los Angeles high 
school, Birmingham High). The newspaper was able to determine that ―at least 53% of the students 
who began at Birmingham in ninth grade [in the Fall of 2001] graduated four years later,‖ and that 
―[a]t least 9% were continuing their education [elsewhere],‖ and that ―[a]t least 12% were not in 
school of any kind.‖ Id. That leaves 16% of the student body who ―couldn‘t be found, although 
extensive inquiries at area schools suggested most were not active students.‖ Id. In real numbers, this 
means 281 students at one high school alone whose status was unknown. Id. 
 56. At least three students were reported as transferring to nearby schools but the new schools 
said they either never showed up, or had no record of the student at all. Two students were reported as 
transferring to schools in Utah and Texas, but neither school listed exists, and both students were still 
in the Los Angeles area, one of whom explicitly said she had no intention to moving to Utah. Id. One 
attendance counselor at the school, when asked about one of these students replied, ―I‘m trying to save 
kids here . . . I can‘t save this kid.‖ Id. 
 57. See Hyman, supra note 12, at 685; Landsberg, supra note 55 (noting that the students at 
Birmingham High who were noted as transfers but had actually dropped-out or were pushed-out did 
not count toward the school‘s dropout rate because they were listed as ―transfers.‖). Jonathan Kozol 
describes similar evidence in Houston, where high school graduation rates gains ―appear to have been 
overstated or outrightly false.‖ KOZOL, supra note 53, at 207. Kozol notes a study by the New York 
Times that ―‗more than half the students‘ who had disappeared from 16 middle schools and high 
schools . . . should have been identified as dropouts, ‗but were not.‘‖ Id. This includes one high school 
that claimed that zero students had dropped out, ―even though 460 students had disappeared from the 
enrollment of the school that year.‖ Id. This practice has been documented in Florida as well, where 
students referred to GED programs do not count as dropouts toward graduation rate calculations, even 
though there is no system in place to ensure the students actually enroll in a GED program. NewsHour 
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Further, New York law ―prohibits almost all involuntary discharges 
and transfers without due process,‖58 yet the evidence of pushouts at 
multiple schools suggests that these statutes are not supported by adequate 
oversight. In Los Angeles, evidence suggesting the improper use of 
―opportunity transfers‖ also implies a lack of proper oversight.59 In other 
situations, pushouts may go unnoticed because the pushed-out students are 
counted as dropouts or voluntary transfers when in fact they were coerced 
into making such decisions.
60
 
3. The Evidence: Where Pushouts Occur 
The most widespread public attention afforded pushouts came in New 
York City after the city‘s Public Advocate and the group Advocates for 
 
 
with Jim Lehrer: Disappearing Dropouts (PBS television broadcast Nov. 30, 2004) (transcript 
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/education/july-dec04/dropouts_11-30.html). At Evans 
High School in Orlando, 440 students were ―transferred‖ into the GED program over two years, but 
only fourteen actually enrolled. Id. 
 58. Office of the Public Advocate, supra note 21, at 6. The process due to a student removed for 
truancy includes the following requirements: the student must have been absent twenty consecutive 
school days, the principal must notify the student and parent and schedule an ―informal conference,‖ 
where the principal ―shall determine both the reasons for the pupil‘s absence and whether reasonable 
changes in the pupil‘s educational program would encourage and facilitate his or her re-entry or 
continuance of study.‖ Id. at 22 n.19. The student and parents must also ―be informed orally and in 
writing of the pupil‘s right to re-enroll at any time . . . if otherwise qualified . . . .‖ N.Y. EDUC. LAW 
§ 3202(1-a) (McKinney 2009). New York law also maintains due process protections for suspensions 
and expulsions, including that: 
No pupil may be suspended for a period in excess of five school days unless such pupil and 
the person in parental relation to such pupil shall have had an opportunity for a fair hearing, 
upon reasonable notice, at which such pupil shall have the right of representation by counsel, 
with the right to question witnesses against such pupil and to present witnesses and other 
evidence on his or her behalf. 
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3214(3)(c)(1) (McKinney 2008). 
 59. ―Opportunity Transfer‖ (OT) is a process by which school officials in the Los Angeles 
Unified School District (LAUSD) can transfer a student from one school to another: ―1) to promote the 
positive social and/or academic adjustment of a particular student and 2) to promote school safety for 
all students.‖ Bulletin from Deputy Superintendent, Operations and Support Servs., L.A. Unified 
School Dist. to All Schools and Offices, Bulletin No. Z-58: Opportunity Transfers 1 (Apr. 20, 1999), 
available at http://notebook.lausd.net/pls/ptl/docs/PAGE/CA_LAUSD/FLDR_ORGANIZATIONS/ 
STUDENT_HEALTH_HUMAN_SERVICES/BULLETIN%20Z-58%2C%20OT%20REV_0.PDF 
[hereinafter LAUSD Bulletin]. OTs are explicitly forbidden for ―tardiness, or other attendance-related 
issues‖ as well as ―as a remedy for low academic achievement.‖ Id. at 7. Despite this policy, there is 
evidence OTs were improperly used as a pushout mechanism. See „Opportunity Transfers‟ Used to 
Expel Poor students, Claim Protesters, TIDINGS, Jan. 6, 2006, available at http://www.the-tidings. 
com/2006/0106/expelled.htm [hereinafter TIDINGS]. 
 60. See, e.g., ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 25 (describing students in Alabama who were told 
they needed to withdraw and handed forms labeled ―withdrawal. Reason: Lack of Interest.‖); Lewin & 
Medina, supra note 34 (describing students coded as ―transferred to another educational setting,‖ when 
this could mean they were pushed out and told to enroll in an ―alternative education setting‖ such as a 
GED program). 
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Children released a report documenting the issue in November of 2002.
61
 
Examining the large number of ―discharged‖ students, the report 
speculated that these statistics, ―[c]oupled with anecdotal information,‖ 
suggest that ―students who are at-risk, or who will need extra years to 
graduate, may be encouraged to leave regular high schools or be ‗pushed 
out.‘‖62 Local and national media began to cover the pushouts, including 
articles in the New York Post,
63
 the Village Voice,
64
 and a series of in-
depth articles published in the New York Times.
65
 While a spokesman for 
New York City schools first denied the practices occurred,
66
 New York 
City Schools Chancellor Joel Klein subsequently acknowledged that 
pushouts were ―not just a few instances, [but] a real issue,‖67 calling them 
―a disservice to our students and ourselves.‖68 
In response to these practices at three schools, AFC filed lawsuits on 
behalf of the pushed-out students and their parents.
69
 The students asserted 
that the pushouts violated their rights of Due Process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, New York state 
education law provisions, and New York City Chancellor‘s Regulations.70 
 
 
 61. Office of the Public Advocate, supra note 21. The report revealed that in 2001 alone, ―more 
than 55,015 students were discharged, compared with 14,549 who dropped out from the same group of 
schools.‖ Id. at 2. Though not all of these ―discharges‖ were pushouts and many were likely valid 
transfers or age-outs, the report also notes that while this discharge ―figure is very large, it does not 
represent the true number of citywide discharges, since many schools and programs did not produce 
discharge numbers.‖ Id. at 9. Conversely, the graduating class of 2001 in New York City totaled only 
33,520 students. Id. at 5. At many schools, discharges constituted over twenty-five percent of the 
school‘s peak enrollment, including a staggering forty-one percent at Taft High in the Bronx. Id. at 11–
14. 
 62. Id. at 5. 
 63. Carl Campanile, Shocker of Booted Students, N.Y. POST, Nov. 9, 2002, at 9. 
 64. Nat Hentoff, Testing to Create Dropouts?, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 23, 2003, at 24. 
 65. Lewin & Medina, supra note 34; Jennifer Medina & Tamar Lewin, High School Under 
Scrutiny for Giving Up on Its Students, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, at A1. 
 66. Campanile, supra note 63 (quoting Department of Education spokesman Kevin Ortiz and 
asserting that he claimed, in the words of the article author, that ―high schools are not illegally tossing 
kids out‖). 
 67. Medina & Lewis, supra note 65. 
 68. Lewin & Medina, supra note 34. 
 69. See Complaint, Ruiz v. Pedota, 321 F. Supp. 2d (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (Civ. No. 03-0502); 
Complaint, RV v. N.Y. City Dep‘t of Educ., 321 F. Supp. 2d 538 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (Civ. No. 03-5649); 
Complaint, S.G. v. N.Y. City Dep‘t of Educ., 321 F. Supp. 2d (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (Civ. No. 03-5152), 
available at http://www.advocatesforchildren.org/litigation/litdocs/pushoutdocs (explaining some of 
the basic facts alleged at Franklin K. Lane, Martin Luther King Jr., and Bushwick High School). 
 70. Complaint, Ruiz, supra note 69, ¶¶ 135–40; Complaint, RV, supra note 69, ¶¶ 77–80, 
Complaint, S.G., supra note 69, ¶¶ 72–76; Additionally, in Ruiz, learning-disabled plaintiffs claimed 
violations of the IDEA and English-language learner plaintiffs claimed violations under Title III of the 
No Child Left Behind Act. Complaint, Ruiz, supra note 69, ¶¶ 137–38. In S.G., plaintiffs claimed a 
violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 by discriminating against a student ―on the 
basis of her status as a pregnant student.‖ Complaint, S.G., supra note 69, ¶ 74. 
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Though the city took steps to change the policies directed at discharging 
and transferring students after AFC filed the first suit,
71
 AFC was 
unsatisfied and filed the second and third suits.
72
 Eventually, two of the 
cases were settled, allowing readmission to the classes of plaintiffs, 
supplemental remedial services, new programs to address the problems, 
and additional training for some administrators and counselors.
73
 Despite 
this significant settlement, pushout practices appear to continue in New 
York.
74
 
Unfortunately, documentation of pushouts is not limited to New York 
City. In Alabama, school leaders admitted that they withdrew 522 students 
without their consent in the spring of 2000.
75
 The practice allegedly 
continued in 2002 due to new testing pressures from the Alabama High 
School Graduation Exam.
76
 In Houston, a former school administrator 
described techniques that the Houston Independent School District (HISD) 
used to directly push students out,
77
 as well as other techniques designed 
to manipulate test scores that constructively pushed-out students retained 
for multiple years in the same grade.
78
 School district leaders in both 
Denver and Chicago acknowledged the practice as well,
79
 while not 
 
 
 71. Hyman, supra note 12, at 687 (mentioning the decision to ―hastily issue[] new citywide 
policies for discharging and transferring students to incorporate a pre[-]discharge conference and 
notice of rights to students‖); Tamar Lewin, City to Track Why Students Leave School: Moving to End 
Practice That Pushed Some Aside, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at B1. 
 72. Hyman, supra note 12, at 687. 
 73. RV, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 543–59; Hyman, supra note 12, at 688 (describing the terms of the 
settlement).  
 74. See also Complaint, D.S. v. N.Y. City Dep‘t of Educ. 255 F.R.D. 60 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (Civ. 
No. 05-4787); Yoav Gonen, City $chooled on Pushing Kids Out, N.Y. POST, Oct. 14, 2008, available 
at http://www.nypost.com/seven/10142008/news/regionalnews/city_chooled_on_pushing_kids_out_ 
133569.htm (describing how students were ―assigned shortened schedules and noncredit-bearing 
classes or else warehoused in the auditorium,‖ and the preliminary approval of a settlement in the 
ensuing lawsuit); Carrie Melago, City Students Illegally Pushed Out of School Because of Age, Survey 
Shows, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 21, 2008, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_local/ 
education/2008/02/22/2008-02-22_city_students_illegally_pushed_out_of_sc-1.html; ADVOCATES FOR 
CHILDREN, supra note 6. 
 75. ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 25–26 (describing students pushed out in Birmingham, 
some of whom were handed withdrawal forms already filled out for them. School administrators 
explained that ―students were withdrawn to remove low-achieving (i.e., low-scoring) students in order 
to raise Stanford Achievement Test . . . scores.‖). 
 76. Id. at 26. The article further notes that, ―[t]o this day, students continue to be ‗withdrawn‘ 
from school for lack of interest, academic failure, and poor attendance,‖ and ―withdrawn . . . students 
are often not assigned to any alternative educational forum.‖ Id. 
 77. See Robert H. Kimball, How Hispanics are Pushed Out of Public Education, EDUC. EQUITY, 
POLITICS & POLICY IN TEXAS, Feb. 15, 2005, http://texasedequity.blogspot.com/2005/02/how-
hispanics-are-pushed-out-of-public.html (describing practices in the HISD that constructively pushed 
out students). 
 78. Id.; Salinas & Kimball, supra note 22, at 230. 
 79. Karen Rouse, Push Comes to Shove for Dropouts, DENVER POST, Aug. 19, 2006, available at 
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discussing specific examples. A Native American leader in South Dakota 
also alleged that schools there pushed out children through ―discriminatory 
use of attendance and discipline policies.‖80 
In Los Angeles, a community group, Community Asset Development 
Re-defining Education (CADRE), identified several ways the Los Angeles 
Unified School District (LAUSD) used disciplinary rationales, including 
improperly applied ―opportunity transfers,‖81 to push students out.82 
Another activist group claimed that such transfers were improperly used as 
―an opportunity to kick out low-performing students.‖83 CADRE provided 
 
 
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_4206746. Cindy Stevenson, superintendent of the Jefferson 
County School District offered that, ―I think we all know that historically . . . kids have subtly been 
given the suggestion that they go someplace else,‖ and ―Brad Jupp, senior academic policy adviser for 
Denver Public Schools, said officials recognize schools ‗have histories of pushing kids out.‘‖ Id.; Shiri 
Klima, Note, The Children We Leave Behind: Effects of High-Stakes Testing on Dropout Rates, 17 S. 
CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 3, 20 (2007) (citing the statements of Superintendent of Chicago Schools 
Robert Schiller). 
 80. See Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1029 (D.S.D. 2004). 
According to the former director of education for the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, Sherry Red Owl-
Neiss, Indian children are being ―pushed out‖ of school in Tripp County through the 
discriminatory use of attendance and discipline policies, a phenomenon that she attributes to 
racism: ―It comes from the cultural conflict and the underlying racism that exists not just in 
the school, but in the community there.‖ As support for this position, Red Owl-Neiss cited the 
district‘s refusal to bus Indian children to school and the school board‘s refusal to meet 
privately with the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Education Committee to discuss the effect of 
discipline policies on Indian children. 
Id. at 1029–30 (citations omitted). 
 81. See LAUSD Bulletin, supra note 59, at 1 (describing opportunity transfers). The LAUSD 
notes that opportunity transfers may be made without parental approval for ―progressive discipline‖ 
purposes and for a ―single, serious act.‖ Id. at 2–3. These transfers are specifically prohibited for the 
following reasons: ―truancy, tardiness, or other attendance-related issues,‖ ―to preclude the provision 
of special education or Section 504 services, or to replace the IEP or 504 review process. Nor may 
O.T.s be used as a remedy for low academic achievement . . . .‖ Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
 82. See Community Asset Development Re-Defining Education (CADRE), A Call to Action to 
Stop the Pushout Crisis in South Los Angelesi, June 14, 2006, at 2, available at http://www.cadre-la. 
org/media/docs/2184_MoreEdLessSusp_Report060806FINAL.pdf [hereinafter CADRE] (describing 
push-outs as beginning with ―a series of classroom and school removals‖ which cumulatively over 
time ―dismantl[e] educational access,‖ and move to the ―next level,‖ through the ―enthusiastic use of 
‗opportunity transfers,‘ despite the fact that they are banned in other large school districts and were 
recently removed from state law‖). 
 83. TIDINGS, supra note 59. The article, citing L.A. VOICE, describes the transfer policy as a 
way to move around ―‗struggling students‘ to other locations, knowing full well that they may never 
re-enroll,‖ and notes that such students are not counted toward the dropout rate. Id. Lisa Milton, the 
group‘s executive director, claims that ―[t]hese opportunity transfers are nothing more than an 
opportunity to kick out low-performing students.‖ Id. Milton adds that many students drop-out as a 
result because the new school is too far, or the paperwork gets misplaced, causing the student to have 
no school to go to. Id. Such was the situation of ―David,‖ a student who was given an opportunity 
transfer based on an untrue accusation of bad behavior, whose new school said it had no paperwork, 
and whose old school would not take him back. Id. As a result, David had already missed two months 
of school. Id.  
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additional support for this assertion through surveys that affirmed the 
prevalence of pushouts in the LAUSD.
84
 Other than the lawsuits filed by 
AFC in New York City, pushout litigation remains sparse. 
III. USING PAST LESSONS: PREVIOUS EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS LITIGATION 
AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO PUSHOUTS 
While pushout litigation has so far been limited, the Civil Rights 
Movement and subsequent legal developments unleashed a flurry of other 
educational rights litigation, some of which may have application in the 
pushout context.
85
 First, the Supreme Court extended limited procedural 
due process protections to school disciplinary proceedings, a context that 
also involves school exclusions.
86
 Second, litigants have also claimed 
violations of substantive due process in this context, though their success 
has been limited.
87
 Third, advocates for school-funding equity 
unsuccessfully pursued federal equal protection claims, but subsequently 
succeeded in state courts, using state education clauses and equal 
protection clauses.
88
 While the recent litigation brought by AFC is a 
helpful guide for potential claims, all of AFC‘s pushout lawsuits have 
settled,
89
 thereby making it difficult to predict the likely outcomes for the 
different causes of action. The only relevant pushout case that reached a 
judgment was the Knight case in 1969, when Judge Weinstein found a due 
process but not equal protection violation in the school‘s conduct.90 Thus, 
each track of previous educational rights litigation provides some insight 
into the way courts may treat pushout claims. 
 
 
 84. See CADRE, supra note 82, at 2, 8 (finding that out of 120 young adults who left regular 
high school, 49% were asked to leave. The reasons cited for being asked to leave were: 36% behavior 
problems, 17% suspensions, 10% opportunity transfers. Of those asked to leave, 33% say they were 
―told they had to leave,‖ and 51% who left school ―were out of school from months to years before 
receiving alternative education.‖). The group launched a campaign which ultimately led to significant 
changes in the LAUSD disciplinary policy, notably, in making a ―positive behavioral support‖ model 
its foundation. Press Release, Maisie Chin, CADRE, CADRE Parents Win Districtwide Policy 
Victory! Year-Long Campaign Results in New LAUSD Discipline Policy (Mar. 1, 2007), http://www. 
cadre-la.org/article/9. 
 85. Sabel & Simon, supra note 17, at 1022 (describing ―three successive waves of public law 
litigation concerning schools‖ in light of the end to overt ―massive resistance‖ to school integration). 
 86. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
 87. See infra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 88. See, e.g., Roni R. Reed, Note, Education and the State Constitutions: Alternatives for 
Suspended and Expelled Students, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 582 (1996) (discussing state courts‘ analysis 
of equal protection and state constitutional education rights to suspended and expelled students). 
 89. See Hyman, supra note 12, at 688–89; Gonen, supra note 74. 
 90. Knight v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 48 F.R.D. 115, 117 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss3/5
  
 
 
 
 
2010] LEFT BEHIND, AND THEN PUSHED OUT 679 
 
 
 
 
A. School Discipline and the Process Due for Exclusionary Practices 
The seminal case regarding the due process rights of students facing 
school discipline and exclusion is Goss v. Lopez.
91
 In Goss, students 
suspended from a public high school in Columbus, Ohio, for nearly ten 
days without a hearing sued the school, claiming a violation of their right 
to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
92
 The Court 
held that students have property interests in their education, as well as 
liberty interests in protecting their ―reputation‖ or ―honor‖ against 
government action,
93
 such that exclusions for ―more than a trivial period‖ 
require due process.
94
 In asking what process was due, the Court held that 
suspended students at a minimum are entitled to ―some kind of notice and 
[must be] afforded some kind of hearing.‖95 Beyond this broadly worded 
mandate, the Court provided little other guidance except as to timing
96
 and 
the type of notice,
97
 in effect requiring only a discussion between the 
student and administrator before the suspension is issued.
98
 
Importantly, however, the Court noted that suspensions of more than 
ten days or expulsions ―may require more formal procedures‖ than it 
outlined.
99
 The Supreme Court itself has not addressed what process may 
be due for these longer exclusions, but has deferred to lower courts‘ 
application of the three-part balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge.
100
 
 
 
 91. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
 92. Id. at 568–69. 
 93. Id. at 574. 
 94. Id. at 576 (―[T]he State is constrained to recognize a student‘s legitimate entitlement to a 
public education as a property interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause and which may 
not be taken away for misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures required by that 
Clause.‖). 
 95. Id. at 579. 
 96. Id. at 582 (―There need be no delay between the time ‗notice‘ is given and the time of the 
hearing.‖) 
 97. Id. (―[I]n being given an opportunity to explain his version of the facts . . . the student first 
[must] be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis of the accusation is.‖). 
 98. See MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
58 (3d ed., West 2009) (―Essentially, the ‗hearing‘ required in Goss is a conversation between the 
student and the disciplinarian.‖). 
 99. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (―We should also make it clear that we have 
addressed ourselves solely to the short suspension, not exceeding 10 days.‖) 
 100. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see also Larry Bartlett & James McCullagh, Exclusion From the 
Educational Process in the Public Schools: What Process is Now Due, 1993 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 6 
(1993) (noting that ―[s]ince the 1970s,‖ the Court has settled on the Mathews balancing test to 
determine what ―process is due and the form in which it is to be applied.‖); Brent M. Pattison, 
Questioning School Discipline: Due Process, Confrontation, and School Discipline Hearings, 18 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 49, 51 (2008) (―Although the Supreme Court has not further defined 
the contours of procedural due process in the context of long-term suspensions or expulsions, it has 
given lower courts the tool to do so with the Mathews test.‖). 
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The test examines what process is due by balancing the interest of the 
litigant, the possibility of deprivation of such an interest by the current 
procedures and the value of additional protections, along with the 
governmental interest.
101
 Lower courts have applied the Mathews test to 
determine the process due to students facing more significant exclusions 
than ten-day suspensions, with varying results. Some courts have 
interpreted due process protections for extended suspensions or expulsions 
to include, in addition to notice and a pre-exclusion hearing, the right to 
counsel, an impartial arbiter, and the presentation of witnesses and 
evidence.
102
 Other courts have found that even in an expulsion hearing, 
students do not have the due process right to cross-examine witnesses or 
be present during closed deliberations where the principal and 
superintendent can.
103
 
Additionally, in the case of Board of Curators of the University of 
Missouri v. Horowitz,
104
 the Court distinguished disciplinary actions from 
situations where the school removes the student for academic reasons.
105
 
In reasoning that dismissals for academic reasons do not generally require 
hearings,
106
 the Court noted its concerns about ―[j]udicial interposition in 
the operation of the public school system.‖107 Justice Marshall, concurring 
with the propriety of the student‘s dismissal,108 offered a dissenting vision 
 
 
 101. The test to determine ―what process is due‖ looks at:  
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of any additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government‘s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 102. See Pattison, supra note 100, at 52 (listing cases that granted these due process rights). These 
cited cases include Black Coal. v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1973) (pre-
Goss case finding that ―expulsion procedures were unconstitutional for failing to provide a hearing at 
which the student could be represented by counsel and, through counsel, present witnesses on his own 
behalf, and crossexamine adverse witnesses.‖) and Gonzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460, 464–65 
(C.D. Cal. 1977) (right to an impartial tribunal). 
 103. See, e.g., Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 924 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding 
that the expelled student was ―not denied due process by not being permitted to cross-examine . . . his 
student accusers, . . . [or] the school principal and superintendent, and by not being permitted to be 
present at the school board‘s closed deliberations even though the school principal and superintendent 
were allowed to attend‖). 
 104. 435 U.S. 78 (1978). The student expelled in Horowitz was a medical student who had been 
given notice several times of her poor performance and put on probationary status. Id. 
 105. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 86 (―[T]he significant difference between the failure of a student to 
meet academic standards and the violation by a student of valid rules of conduct . . . calls for far less 
stringent procedural requirements in the case of academic dismissal.‖). 
 106. Id. at 87. 
 107. Id. at 91. 
 108. Id. at 99 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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of the process due to students excluded for academic or disciplinary 
reasons, arguing that the Court should employ the Mathews balancing test 
rather than the ―lower level of protection involved in Goss.‖109 
A federal due process claim for a disciplinary exclusion provides the 
most factually analogous cause of action for many pushout cases. First, 
Knight recognized this as a valid claim in the pushout context, noting that 
―[e]ven if the criteria for expulsion were valid, lack of procedural due 
process‖ made the expulsion invalid.110 Additionally, there are close 
factual similarities between pushouts and disciplinary exclusions: both 
involve school authorities exerting their power to remove students from a 
learning environment. Due process claims also allow the court to rule 
against a school‘s lack of procedural protections without venturing into the 
murkier waters of substantive educational policy.
111
 Further, Goss itself 
suggested that for exclusions greater than ten-day suspensions, greater 
process may be due,
112
 which subsequent lower courts have allowed.
113
 
Pushouts fit in this latter category without any stretch, as the complete 
denial of a student‘s ability to pursue a diploma is tantamount to an 
expulsion. Even if school officials try to circumvent due process 
protections by asserting an academic justification for the pushout,
114
 
school districts are governed by state laws guaranteeing an education to 
students up until a certain age and thus do not have the same ―academic 
freedom‖ as universities to dismiss otherwise eligible students solely on 
academic grounds.
115
 Thus, the procedural protections of notice and a 
 
 
 109. See id. at 99–101. 
 110. Knight v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 48 F.R.D. 108, 111 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). 
 111. The Supreme Court has expressed a reluctance to involve itself in ―difficult questions of 
educational policy.‖ San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973). The Court 
reasoned that ―this Court‘s lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels against premature 
interference with the informed judgments made at the state and local levels.‖ Id. It went on to say that 
―[t]he very complexity of . . . managing a statewide public school system suggests that there will be 
more than one constitutionally permissible method of solving them,‖ and thus ―the legislature‘s efforts 
. . . should be entitled to respect.‖ Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 112. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 419, 584 (1975) (noting that longer suspensions or expulsions ―may 
require more formal procedures‖). 
 113. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 114. See Horowitz, 435 U.S at 86. Evidence shows that many administrators do use academic 
rationales for pushing students out, even if these reasons do not comport with state law. See Rivkin, 
supra note 7, at 277. This is particularly true for students referred to as ―overage and under-credited.‖ 
See Hyman, supra note 12, at 684. 
 115. Compare N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3202 (McKinney 2009) (―A person over five and under twenty-
one years of age who has not received a high school diploma is entitled to attend the public schools 
. . . .‖), and MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (amended 1976) (Vernon 2008) (―A general diffusion of 
knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, 
the general assembly shall establish and maintain free public schools for the gratuitous instruction of 
all persons in this state within ages not in excess of twenty-one years as prescribed by law.‖), with 
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hearing offered by Goss for disciplinary actions should at a minimum be 
available in the pushout context,
116
 and likely more extensive and 
formalized due process protections as well, depending on the court‘s 
application of the Mathews test to the particular pushout claim. 
B. Substantive Due Process Claims in Education 
Litigants have also raised substantive due process claims in the context 
of educational rights, usually in cases challenging school discipline. The 
Constitution provides no explicit right to an education, and the Supreme 
Court has held that it is not a ―fundamental right.‖117 Therefore, in order 
for a school‘s conduct to violate a student‘s substantive due process rights, 
it must transgress the ―‗outer limit‘ of legitimate governmental action,‖ 
and be ―arbitrary, conscience-shocking, or oppressive,‖ but not merely 
―incorrect or ill-advised.‖118 The Supreme Court has expressed a great 
hesitation to overturn the disciplinary decisions of school administrators, 
especially if a decision is merely ―lacking a basis in wisdom or 
compassion.‖119 Additionally, the Court has been heavily reluctant to 
extend substantive due process protections to any but the most egregious 
abuses and arbitrary administration of government power.
120
 In light of 
this, the vast majority of substantive due process challenges to school 
disciplinary measures have failed, as not rising to the sufficient level of 
―conscience-shocking‖ behavior in the constitutional sense.121 However, 
 
 
Horowitz, 435 U.S at 90 (suggesting a limitation to higher education by noting, ―[l]ike the decision of 
an individual professor as to the proper grade for a student in his course,‖ a dismissal for academic 
reasons ―is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking‖). 
 116. Goss, 419 U.S. at 579. 
 117. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. 
 118. Cohn v. New Paltz Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F. Supp. 2d 421, 434 (N.D.N.Y. 2005); see also Bell 
v. Ohio State Univ., 351 F.3d 240, 250 (6th Cir. 2003) (―Interests protected by substantive due process 
. . . include those protected by specific constitutional guarantees . . . freedom from government actions 
that ‗shock the conscience,‘ . . . and certain interests that the Supreme Court has found . . . to be 
fundamental.‖). 
 119. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975) (The Court further recognized that while 
―students do have substantive and procedural rights while at school . . . . [section] 1983 was not 
intended to be a vehicle for federal-court corrections of [school administration‘s discretionary errors] 
which do not rise to the level of violations of specific constitutional guarantees.‖). 
 120. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 846 (1998). The Court noted that it 
has ―always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process . . . .‖ (quoting Collins v. 
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). It went on to say that ―only the most egregious official 
conduct can be said to be ‗arbitrary in the constitutional sense,‘‖ which means that the ―cognizable 
level of executive abuse of power [is] that which shocks the conscience.‖ Id. at 846.  
 121. See, e.g., C.B. ex rel Breeding v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding no violation 
of substantive due process violation in the school disciplinary context); Cohn, 363 F. Supp. 2d 421; see 
also Dunn v. Fairfield Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 225, 158 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1998) (denying 
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litigants in Indiana succeeded on a substantive due process claim, with the 
court finding that a rule requiring a grade reduction in classes for each day 
a student was suspended was ―unreasonable and arbitrary on its face.‖122 
Pursuing substantive due process claims in the pushout context offers 
uncertain results. On one hand, educational substantive due process claims 
rarely succeed under the current framework.
123
 This is because courts are 
deferential to the judgment of local educational authorities, and because 
the requirement that the school officials‘ conduct be ―arbitrary, 
conscience-shocking, or oppressive‖ is not easily met.124 On the other 
hand, some judges may reasonably regard pushouts such as the ones 
documented in New York as ―conscience-shocking.‖125 Because pushouts 
violate the academic policies of the school districts and states themselves, 
courts may find no rational relationship at all between a pushout and the 
school‘s asserted goals, and are unlikely to accept any rationale for illegal 
conduct as a ―legitimate‖ interest. Further, because pushouts contain an 
element of arbitrariness, where some struggling students are spared but 
others sacrificed, a court may well find that this is the type of abuse of 
executive power substantive due process is meant to protect. However, 
because courts will likely be able to find violations on procedural due 
process or state law grounds, they may be reluctant to wade into the waters 
of substantive due process.
126
 
C. A Fundamental Right? Equal Protection, School Finance, and the 
Move to State Courts  
Litigation concerning the equality and adequacy of school financing 
schemes presents a useful foundation for pushouts. Though these claims 
 
 
substantive due process claim of two high school students based on a comparison to the Lewis case, 
finding that ―if a police officer‘s ‗precipitate recklessness,‘ which caused the deprivation of someone‘s 
life, was not sufficiently shocking to satisfy substantive due process standards, then it would be nearly 
absurd to say that a school principal‘s decision effectively to give two students an ‗F‘ in Band class 
did‖). 
 122. Smith v. Sch. City of Hobart, 811 F. Supp. 391, 398–99 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (―To warrant an 
academic sanction, a student‘s misconduct must be directly related to the student‘s academic 
performance, and there is no indication in this record that such is the case.‖). 
 123. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 124. Cohn, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 434. 
 125. See supra Part II.B.3. The examples noted have a devastating effect—many students were 
kept out of school for illegal reasons and bad motives and may never recover from such effects. 
 126. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998) (―Where a particular 
Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of 
government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, 
must be the guide for analyzing these claims.‖) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994)). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
684 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:663 
 
 
 
 
do not concern action against individual students, interpreting courts have 
considered educational rights in the context of federal equal protection,
127
 
and under the educational rights provided by state constitutions.
128
 As 
such, they provide a roadmap for the current status of litigating 
educational rights claims under these principles. 
1. Federal Equal Protection Claims 
Stemming from school desegregation litigation, litigants began to bring 
claims addressing the unequal ―distribution of educational resources‖129 by 
claiming that disparities in finances between school districts were 
correlated to race or income and violated the federal Constitution‘s Equal 
Protection Clause.
130
 While this claim was successful in California,
131
 the 
U.S. Supreme Court found otherwise two years later. In San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
132
 the Court examined Texas‘ 
school funding plan in light of a challenge by Mexican-American parents 
who alleged that the funding disparities between their school district, 
which allocated $356 per pupil, and a more affluent and majority white 
district nearby, which allocated $594 per pupil, constituted an equal 
protection violation.
133
 The Court reversed the district court,
134
 holding 
that the unequal distribution of educational funding in Texas did not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause because no particular ―suspect class‖ 
was discriminated against
135
 and because education is not a protected 
―fundamental right‖ under the U.S. Constitution.136 The Court applied 
 
 
 127. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202 (1982). 
 128. Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the “Third Wave”: From 
Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1995) (describing the use of equal protection and 
education clauses in state constitutions as part of the ―third wave‖ of school finance litigation.). 
 129. James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 258–59 (1999). 
 130. See Heise, supra note 128, at 1153–54. 
 131. See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1252–53, 1258, 1263 (Cal. 1971), cert. denied, 432 
U.S. 907 (1977) (holding the California school funding scheme unconstitutional after finding that this 
financing system implicated a suspect class of individuals as well as a fundamental right, and that 
because the funding scheme was ―not necessary to the attainment of any compelling state interest,‖ the 
State did not meet the burden of strict scrutiny). 
 132. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 133. Id. at 4, 12–13. 
 134. The district court had held that the Texas system discriminated on the basis of wealth, which 
it considered a suspect classification, and because a suspect class was implicated and because it held 
education to be a fundamental right, the court applied strict scrutiny and found the defendants did not 
provide a compelling state interest for the financing scheme, or even a rational basis, to justify the 
classifications. See id. at 16. 
 135. Id. at 24–25; see also Heise, supra note 128, at 1156. 
 136. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35; Heise, supra note 128, at 1156. 
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rational basis review and found that ―giving substance to the presumption 
of validity‖ to the Texas system, the financing scheme ―abundantly‖ met 
the standard of rationally furthering a legitimate state interest.
137
 
Despite this holding, the Court left room for finding an equal protection 
violation in the instance of ―an absolute denial of educational 
opportunities.‖138 Nine years later, the Court dealt with such an issue in 
Plyler v. Doe, where school-aged Mexican-American children not legally 
in the U.S. challenged a Texas law which withheld funds from school 
districts for students not ―legally admitted‖ into the U.S., and which 
allowed local school districts to deny enrollment to such children.
139
 While 
recognizing that the children could not constitute a ―suspect class‖ because 
of their illegal status, and that education is not a ―fundamental right,‖ the 
Court took account of the law‘s ―costs to the Nation and to the innocent 
children who are its victims‖ in determining the ―rationality‖ of the law.140 
As such, it imposed a standard greater than the deferential rational basis 
test, and required the state to show a ―substantial‖ rather than just 
―legitimate‖ interest in denying the children of undocumented immigrants 
the right to attend school.
141
 Applying this standard, the Court found that 
the State had no substantial interest by which it could justify the law‘s 
rationality.
142
 
2. “Equity” and “Adequacy” Claims in State Courts 
Following the failure of school finance litigation in federal court, 
litigants brought their struggle to state courts, challenging per-pupil 
spending discrepancies under state equal protection and state constitution 
educational clauses.
143
 These ―second wave‖ school finance cases 
challenged school financing based on its inequity among different student 
groups,
144
 with mixed results.
145
 More successful were the ―third wave‖ of 
 
 
 137. Rodriguez, 411 U.S at 55. 
 138. Id. at 37. 
 139. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205–06 (1982). 
 140. Id. at 223–24. 
 141. Id. at 224 (―[T]he discrimination contained in [the Texas law] can hardly be considered 
rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State.‖); see also id. at 230 (―If the State is to 
deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it offers to other children 
residing within its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial 
state interest.‖). 
 142. Id. at 230. 
 143. See Ryan, supra note 129, at 266. 
 144. Heise, supra note 128, at 1157–58. 
 145. Ryan, supra note 129, at 267 (―Of the twenty challenges [seeking to equalize per-pupil 
funding] resolved by state supreme courts, thirteen were rejected and seven were successful.‖). 
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school finance cases, where advocates instead argued that state 
constitutions‘ education provisions (often along with the state equal 
protection clause) guaranteed the right to an ―adequate‖ education which 
was denied by insufficient funding.
146
 In both types of school finance 
litigation, state courts not only reached different outcomes, but also 
applied different theories regarding the equal protection and education 
clauses of state constitutions.
147
 In one notable case, Robinson v. Cahill,
148
 
the New Jersey Supreme Court relied exclusively on the state 
constitution‘s education clause in ruling the school financing system 
unconstitutional.
149
 More recently, in the adequacy context, New York‘s 
highest court interpreted the state‘s education clause broadly, requiring 
―the opportunity for a meaningful high school education, one which 
prepares them to function productively as civic participants.‖150 In a 
number of other finance cases, state supreme courts used education clauses 
as the basis for finding violations of the state‘s equal protection clause.151 
Though the incident-based nature of pushout claims is quite different 
from the broader policy concerns of school finance, educational adequacy 
cases have provided an opportunity for state supreme courts to define 
whether an ―adequate‖ education is a right.152 In states like New York, 
New Jersey, California, and Texas, where such a right has been 
recognized,
153
 bringing a pushout claim under a state constitution‘s 
 
 
 146. Id. at 268 (―[T]hird wave cases . . . are for the most part characterized by a strict focus on 
state education clauses and an emphasis on adequacy rather than equity.‖); see also Michael Heise, 
Litigated Learning, Law‟s Limits, and Urban School Reform Challenges, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1419, 1447 
(2007) (―The shift from school finance equity to adequacy theory coincided with and contributed to 
. . . an increase in the number and rate of successful challenges to state school finance systems.‖). 
 147. See Reed, supra note 88, at 594 (explaining that courts have differed in determining what 
kind of rights state education clauses provide, with some finding that they are the source of a 
fundamental right to an education for the purposes of equal protection analysis, and some that the 
clauses are independent of equal protection rights). 
 148. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) 
 149. See id. at 292 (―The obligation being the State‘s to maintain and support a thorough and 
efficient system of free public schools, the State must meet that obligation . . . .‖); id. at 294 (―A 
system of instruction in any district of the State which is not thorough and efficient falls short of the 
constitutional command. Whatever the reason for the violation, the obligation is the State‘s to rectify 
it.‖); see also Reed, supra note 88, at 596. 
 150. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 332 (N.Y. 2003); Michael A. 
Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 
N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1503 (2007) (describing the court‘s holding). 
 151. See Reed, supra note 88, at 596–98 (describing holdings in cases in Kentucky, Pennsylvania, 
Connecticut, Alabama, and California that ―education is a fundamental right requiring strict scrutiny 
equal protection analysis‖). 
 152. See id. 
 153. N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. State, 824 N.E.2d 947, 949 (N.Y. 2005) (finding a cause of 
action under the Education Article of the State Constitution when ―the State fails its obligation to meet 
minimum constitutional standards of educational equity.‖ The claim requires two elements: 
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education clause may well prove successful. Illegally excluding a student 
from school and causing her to miss valuable educational time may not 
only deprive her of an ―adequate‖ education, but of any further education, 
likely violating state education clauses.
154
  
States that have found that disproportionate school spending requires 
strict (or greater than rational basis) scrutiny under the state‘s equal 
protection clause present an especially promising opportunity.
155
 Though 
states that require a ―suspect classification‖ may create difficulties for 
some plaintiffs in defining an identifiable and suspect class,
156
 even states 
that will not apply strict scrutiny to funding cases may nonetheless do so if 
an education is completely denied by a pushout.
157
 Pushout claims brought 
under state constitutional education provisions may fit well because the 
state has defined the parameters of the education it must provide,
158
 and 
thus its judiciary will be more comfortable in fashioning appropriate 
equitable relief.
159
 However, some states have not interpreted their 
 
 
―deprivation of a sound basic education, and causes attributable to the State.‖); Campaign for Fiscal 
Equity, 801 N.E.2d at 332 (noting that the question to be resolved in a school finance case is ―whether 
the State affords . . . schoolchildren the opportunity for a meaningful high school education, one which 
prepares them to function productively as civic participants‖). 
 154. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 801 N.E.2d at 332; Robinson, 303 A.2d at 292, 294 
(noting that the New Jersey Constitution requires a ―thorough and efficient‖ education, an obligation 
that the state must meet).  
 155. See Reed, supra note 88, at 597–600; Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977) 
(―[T]he state system of financing public elementary and secondary education as it presently exists and 
operates cannot pass the test of ‗strict judicial scrutiny‘ as to its constitutionality.‖); Rose v. Council 
for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 208 (Ky. 1989) (―Lest there be any doubt, the result of our 
decision is that Kentucky‘s entire system of common schools is unconstitutional.‖); Sch. Dist. of 
Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass‘n. 667 A.2d 5, 9 (Pa. 1995) (―[P]ublic education in 
Pennsylvania is a fundamental right.‖). 
 156. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951–53 (Cal. 1976) (finding a fundamental right to 
an education and applying strict scrutiny, but also requiring the existence of a suspect classification; 
wealth, in this case). 
 157. Reed, supra note 88, at 599–600. Virginia and Wisconsin have both recognized fundamental 
education rights, but held that it did not apply to equality of funding. Id. However, the Wisconsin court 
noted that this was because a ―complete denial of educational opportunity‖ was not involved. Kukor v. 
Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 579–80 (Wis. 1989). 
 158. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212–13 (defining ―essential, and minimal, characteristics of an 
‗efficient‘ system of common schools‖ including that they be ―substantially uniform,‖ ―provide equal 
educational opportunities,‖ and recognizing that there is a ―constitutional right to an adequate 
education‖) (emphasis added); Campaign For Fiscal Equity, 303 A.2d at 292. 
 159. In fact, past challenges on this basis have been beneficial in stirring necessary policy reforms. 
This is especially true for states that have been willing to define what constitutes an ―adequate 
education.‖ See Heise, supra note 146, at 1447 (noting that as a consequence of funding adequacy 
cases and ―re-emergence of urban school districts‖ in challenging financing formulas, ―per pupil 
spending in many urban public school districts has improved‖); Klein, supra note 17, at 401–02 
(claiming that the Rose case in Kentucky prompted sweeping educational reform measures). 
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education clauses expansively to require a right to an ―adequate education‖ 
that may be violated by a pushout.
160
 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN IDEAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
PUSHOUTS 
While applying previously used educational rights strategies to the 
pushout context is a useful tool in evaluating their likely effectiveness, 
pushouts require a jurisprudence that considers their unique context and 
far-reaching consequences. This section discusses how courts should apply 
previous educational rights jurisprudence to pushouts. 
A. Why Litigation? 
While the most substantial solutions to the pushout problem likely 
require greater policy changes than litigation alone can provide, pursuing 
litigation is vital for several reasons. First, advocates must act with 
urgency in addressing this issue. As Judge Weinstein aptly remarked in a 
1969 pushout case, ―Education is a necessary and vital aspect of modern 
life, and delay in protecting the rights of these students can be personally 
disastrous to them.‖161 Second, litigation helps focus the public on the 
problem, as evidenced by the New York Times‘ coverage of the AFC 
litigation in 2003 and 2004.
162
 Finally, as the settlement agreements in the 
cases brought by AFC show, litigation can itself produce some of the 
significant policy changes necessary to solving the problem.
163
 Though 
some scholars have suggested that litigation may not be the right strategy 
for remediation because of the potential of lawsuits to hamper 
collaboration on future reform efforts,
164
 these concerns can be addressed 
 
 
 160. See Reed, supra note 88, at 601 (explaining that Maryland and Massachusetts have not found 
a ―fundamental‖ right to education in their state constitutions). 
 161. Knight v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 48 F.R.D. 108, 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). 
 162. See Lewin & Medina, supra note 34; Tamar Lewin, City Settles Suit and Will Take Back 
Students, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2004 at B3; Medina & Lewin, supra note 65. 
 163. See RV, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 543–59; Hyman, supra note 12, at 688–89 (discussing the terms 
of the settlement in two of the AFC cases, which included parental notification and reenrollment of 
excluded students, creation of a ―Young Adult Success Center,‖ greater training for counselors and 
administrators, and creation of an Office of Multiple Pathways to Graduation); D.S. ex rel S.S. v. N.Y. 
City Dep‘t of Educ., 255 F.R.D. 59, 68–69 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (providing an overview of the settlement 
in the Boys and Girls High School pushout litigation, which included programs aimed at remedying 
the exclusions and called for monitoring as well); see also Rebell, supra note 150, at 1467 (noting the 
policy changes spurred by litigation in three states, including the ―redesign and reform of the entire 
education system‖ in Kentucky). 
 164. See Heise, supra note 146, at 1459 (noting that litigation‘s ―adversarial structure‖ may 
―jeopardize collaboration among educators, lawyers, researchers, and parents‖ due to the risk of an 
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through a willingness of adversaries to embrace remedies that allow for 
continued collaboration and some flexibility.
165
 
B. Establishing Causes of Action: How Courts Should Recognize Pushout 
Claims 
The following causes of actions are discussed here with some 
generality, but undoubtedly the viability of each one will depend on the 
factual circumstances and the nature of the lawsuit. Thus, while greater 
procedural protections will likely be necessary in most or all pushout 
cases, substantive due process claims may be more difficult to make in 
some cases than others, and equal protection claims may be best suited to 
class actions or lawsuits with multiple plaintiffs. 
1. The Need for Better Process: Visibility and Voice for Pushed-Out 
Students 
Though courts should, at a minimum, find due process violations under 
Goss when students are pushed out, the severity of the deprivation of 
students‘ property right to an education, coupled with a startling lack of 
process, requires greater protection.
166
 First, the Goss decision itself set 
aside the question of what process is due for suspensions longer than ten 
days or expulsions, and implied that in such situations, greater process 
may be due.
167
 Many lower courts have considered longer suspensions, 
expulsions, and other unusual situations and have produced conflicting 
results.
168
 Courts considering pushouts should trend to the weightier 
 
 
―inherently adversarial posture‖ spilling over ―into non-legal interactions‖ and continuing after the 
lawsuit ends). 
 165. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 17, at 1067–73 (describing how public law remedies with an 
―experimentalist tendency‖ rather than a ―command-and-control‖ orientation provide a promising 
approach by promoting ―stakeholder negotiation‖ and ―transparency,‖ along with greater flexibility in 
adapting specific remedial policies based on the needs on the ground). 
 166. When a state provides a right to education, it may not take away that right even on legitimate 
grounds without ―fundamentally fair procedures.‖ Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). Goss 
notes that the ―State is constrained to recognize a student‘s legitimate entitlement to a public education 
as a property interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause . . . .‖ Id. Because a pushout denies 
a student that property interest without process, at a minimum Goss is implicated. 
 167. See id. at 584 (―Longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or 
permanently, may require more formal procedures. Nor do we put aside the possibility that in unusual 
situations . . . something more than the rudimentary procedures will be requires.‖). 
 168. Compare Carey v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. # 17, 754 F. Supp. 906, 918–19 (D. Me. 1990) 
(applying the Mathews balancing test to an expulsion for weapons possession and finding that ―seven 
minimum requirements . . . must be observed in student disciplinary hearings.‖ These requirements 
are: notice of the charges and the nature of evidence against the student, an opportunity for the student 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
690 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:663 
 
 
 
 
extremes of student protection, and view pushouts as constructive 
expulsion without process.
169
 This means of course that courts should first 
apply the Mathews test, and should do so even if their asserted justification 
for the pushout is academic, as suggested for all school exclusions by 
Justice Marshall‘s concurrence and dissent in Horowitz.170 The Mathews 
test offers the possibility of more expansive due process protection as its 
balancing test affords more flexibility in deciding what process is due 
given the unique context.
171
  
In performing the balancing required by Mathews, courts should 
recognize that a student‘s ―interest in the continuation of his public school 
education is great,‖ as it is the ―very foundation of good citizenship,‖ and 
that the deprivation of one‘s education is a ―very serious matter which 
require[s] significant procedural safeguards.‖172 Unlike a disciplinary 
expulsion, a pushout furthers no legitimate governmental interest, as it 
denies students their educational rights required by state law. In terms of 
what process is actually due, courts should apply a full range of procedural 
protections, bordering on a full trial-like hearing. This is in many ways 
unrealistic, however, because the illegal and subversive nature of the 
pushout itself may undermine the student‘s ability to receive a full pre-
exclusion hearing. Instead, courts should concentrate on providing the 
elements of procedural due process most likely to bring visibility to the 
exclusion and allow the student to tell their story, even if after the 
exclusion itself. These elements include, at a minimum, access to an 
impartial arbiter, a recorded hearing, and the right to confront present 
witnesses. 
 
 
to speak in his own defense, protection from punishment without ―substantial evidence,‖ the 
―assistance of a lawyer in major disciplinary hearings,‖ the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses, and an ―impartial tribunal.‖), with Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 
924–26 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying the Mathews test and finding that a student accused of selling drugs 
is not entitled by due process the right to cross-examine accusing students or school officials, or to 
attend pre-expulsion deliberations which were ―closed.‖). See also Bartlett & McCullagh, supra note 
100, at 38–43 (describing the range of rulings from different district and circuit courts). 
 169. Many pushouts are de facto expulsions, yet the student is not accused of violating the school 
system‘s disciplinary code but merely asked or told to leave for reasons themselves illegal or 
illegitimate. From a due process perspective, then, pushouts should require the maximum procedural 
protections as required by an expulsion. 
 170. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 99–101 (1978) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing for the application of the Mathews test, and finding 
that ―respondent was entitled to more procedural protection than is provided by ‗informal give-and-
take‘ before the school could dismiss her.‖). 
 171. Id. at 100 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 172. Carey, 754 F. Supp. at 918 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 
35–36 (1973), and Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). 
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2. Recognizing Violations of Substantive Due Process 
Many pushout cases require an even greater recognition of the 
deprivation of student rights than procedural due process alone can 
provide, namely in situations where legitimate disciplinary concerns are 
not at issue.
173
 Procedural due process in the pushout context becomes 
largely a reactive measure, and fails to address the wrongfulness not only 
of the process but of the school‘s substantive conduct toward the 
student.
174
 For this, courts should turn to substantive due process, a 
doctrine better suited to protect against the utter arbitrariness at the core of 
pushouts.
175
 Though the ―shocks the conscience test‖ is a high barrier, the 
complete denial of an education for entirely illegitimate reasons should 
readily be viewed by courts as conscience-shocking in light of the 
Supreme Court‘s recognition that denying children an education 
―foreclose[s] any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the 
smallest way to the progress of our Nation.‖176 Though the Supreme Court 
has expressed reluctance to extend § 1983 substantive due process claims 
in the context of education, its rationale centers on the desire not to 
provide ―the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions 
arising in school disciplinary proceedings.‖177 Because pushed-out 
students were never afforded a ―disciplinary proceeding‖ and their 
exclusion is not supported by any legitimate assertion of school policy or 
law, this concern appears less applicable here.
178
 Courts should view the 
 
 
 173. Because many ―academic‖ pushout cases involve no legitimate state interest in maintaining 
safe schools and a code of discipline, a pushout goes beyond a lack of process to the denial of a 
substantive right per se. 
 174. Jessica Falk, Note, Overcoming a Lawyer‟s Dogma: Examining Due Process for the 
“Disruptive Student,” 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 457, 465 (2003) (―The attainment of procedures, 
which is a one-time battle fought in the courts, has too often come to be thought of as an end in itself. 
Instead, processes and procedures need to be thought of as means to the end . . . .‖). 
 175. Substantive due process is violated ―only by conduct that is so outrageously arbitrary as to 
constitute a gross abuse of governmental authority.‖ Cohn v. New Paltz Cent. Sch. Dist., 562 F. Supp. 
2d 421, 434 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Harlen Assocs. v. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 505 (2d Cir. 
2001)). Pushouts fit this characterization, extending beyond mere procedural violations by violating 
the substantive education laws of the state, serving no legitimate governmental purpose, and harming 
the liberty and property interests of the students affected. 
 176. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982). 
 177. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975). 
 178. In addition to the applying the ―shocks the conscience test‖ to find a violation of substantive 
due process in an educational setting, one author has proposed extending substantive due process 
rights recognized for a patient confined by civil commitment patient to require a certain minimal level 
of education. See Note, A Right to Learn?: Improving Educational Outcomes Through Substantive 
Due Process, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1323, 1340–41 (2007) (applying, from Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 
U.S. 307 (1982), the idea of corresponding responsibility, that the State‘s restriction of a person‘s 
liberty carries with it an obligation related to the purpose of that restraint). In Youngberg, this meant a 
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practice of pushouts as exactly the type of abuse of executive power that 
substantive due process seeks to protect, as it is an unlawful decision that 
serves only the personal interest of the administrator and not of the 
student, the school, or the state. 
3. Applying Greater than Rational Basis Scrutiny to Pushout Equal 
Protection Claims  
First, one must acknowledge that equal protection challenges are likely 
a better fit for class action pushout lawsuits than individual student 
challenges to the practice. However, for those claims in which courts can 
readily compare a group of plaintiff students to their peers, equal 
protection claims are highly relevant. Because most pushouts constitute a 
complete denial of educational opportunities otherwise required by law, 
courts should apply greater than the mere rationality review applied in 
Rodriguez.
179
 Instead, courts should require that defendants show a 
substantial governmental interest in distinguishing pushed-out students 
from other similarly situated students as the Court did in Plyler.
180
 Though 
the Supreme Court in Rodriguez did not recognize education as a 
fundamental right worthy of strict scrutiny,
181
 it reserved judgment on a 
situation where there was an ―absolute denial‖ of education.182 Later, the 
Court held in Plyler, where a Texas law allowed school districts to 
completely deny children of undocumented immigrants an education, that 
such a deprivation required the state to show a ―substantial goal‖ in 
making such a distinction, thus elevating the level of scrutiny above mere 
rationality review.
183
 These statements by the Court, along with its 
reasoning in Plyler that education is more than ―merely some 
governmental ‗benefit‘ indistinguishable from other forms of social 
 
 
minimal amount of training for a severely mentally impaired individual. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 319. 
The author argues that in the education context, because a student‘s liberty interests are restricted by 
compulsory education laws, the State has a duty to provide a ―minimal level of education.‖ Note, 
supra, at 1337. Though this model is analogous to pushouts because the state has undertaken the 
responsibility of educating its students, and then denied that right completely by pushing students out, 
its application to pushouts may not be possible as most pushed-out students have reached the legal age 
for choosing to drop out and thus have no further restriction of their ―liberty interest‖ by compulsory 
school attendance. 
 179. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S 1, 40 (1973). 
 180. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230. 
 181. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35 (―Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit 
protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so 
protected.‖). 
 182. Id. at 37. 
 183. Plyler, 457 U.S at 224. 
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welfare legislation,‖184 has led some scholars to argue that ―whether the 
U.S. Constitution ensures a minimal amount of educational services 
remains the subject of continued debate.‖185 
Though students pushed out of school are not as easily definable a 
group as the more definite group of undocumented Mexican-American 
children, the Court in Plyler raised the level of scrutiny without finding 
that this group was a ―suspect class‖ for equal protection purposes.186 Most 
persuasively, the Court‘s rationale in Plyler, that the denial of an education 
must be distinguished from other governmental ―benefits,‖ applies to most 
pushout scenarios, where children with the legal right to complete their 
education are unfairly denied such an opportunity.
187
 Even if a school 
district could escape the extremely deferential level of rational basis 
scrutiny by asserting a rationale based on disciplining unruly students and 
concentrating on the academic achievement of more focused students,
188
 it 
is unlikely the school district can prove that the pushouts serve some 
―substantial‖ goal of the State. Each state, in undertaking the responsibility 
to provide an education to its students, has an interest in seeing those 
students graduate. While it may not further state interests to graduate 
students that have not met state standards, forcing out students who have 
not yet had their full measure of opportunity to complete their education 
serves no substantial interest of any party concerned. 
4. State Constitutions: Education as Fundamental Right and State-
based Reform 
While state pushout jurisprudence will necessarily vary depending on 
state constitutions, most rulings should be fairly direct: pushouts violate a 
student‘s right to an ―adequate‖ education. In states where courts have 
 
 
 184. Id. at 221. The Court further reasoned that ―denial of education to some isolated group of 
children poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of 
governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual 
merit.‖ Id. at 221–22. 
 185. Heise, supra note 128, at 1156. Heise also cites Justice White‘s comment in Papasan v. 
Allain that ―this Court has not yet definitively decided whether a minimally adequate education is a 
fundamental right . . . .‖ Id. at 1157 (quoting Papasan, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986)). 
 186. See Plyler, 457 U.S at 223 (―Undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class . . . . 
Nor is education a fundamental right . . . .). But see id. at 224 (noting that in spite of these 
considerations, the discrimination in the Texas law ―can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers 
some substantial goal of the State‖). 
 187. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 188. Even under rational basis scrutiny, this assertion may fail, because if the plaintiffs can prove 
that a pushout occurred, a court may find that a school district‘s violation of state law and/or its own 
policies cannot advance any legitimate interest of the state. 
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held that certain school financing schemes violate students‘ right to an 
adequate education,
189
 their courts should hold similarly for pushouts. This 
is because pushouts represent not only the denial of an adequate education, 
but of an education altogether. Even for states that do not recognize 
education as a ―fundamental right‖ or require strict scrutiny, most state 
constitutions still require that the state provide an education.
190
 Therefore, 
the complete denial of an education should trigger a cause of action under 
a state constitution, regardless of its stance on adequacy or the status of 
education as a fundamental right. 
C. Overcoming Problems of Proof 
Randee Waldman, a former senior attorney with AFC and the co-
counsel for its lawsuit against Franklin K. Lane High School, speculates 
that a major reason why more pushout lawsuits are not filed may be due to 
problems of proof.
191
 AFC filed their trilogy of pushout lawsuits as well as 
the lawsuit against Boys & Girls High after receiving numerous calls to 
their hotline offering similar stories of pushouts at certain high schools, 
which were further corroborated by ―program cards‖ showing that the 
students were ―transferred‖ to GED programs.192 However, without the 
objective proof of program cards or written orders, school districts may 
claim that students left voluntarily and were not actually ―pushed‖ out.  
From the perspective of litigators, the best way to overcome such an 
argument may be in sheer volume of evidence, which—when presented to 
the court and to the public—has the effect of embarrassing the district into 
either admitting wrongdoing or seeking settlement. One successful 
approach to evidence-gathering was the hotline set up by AFC, which 
allowed easy reporting even for those parents and students who may be 
less politically connected, in conjunction with targeted workshops and 
surveys distributed by other community organizations.
193
 For students who 
cannot produce such tangible evidence or those who were ―encouraged‖ 
rather than directed to leave school, litigators might also consider arguing 
 
 
 189. See supra notes 155–59 and accompanying text. 
 190. See Reed, supra note 88, at 582 (―Every state constitution has an education clause. The 
highest courts of many states have held that their state constitutions‘ education clauses afford 
individuals an enforceable right to education.‖). 
 191. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. The pushouts in Birmingham, Alabama were 
similarly blatant because of the school system‘s use of pre-prepared withdrawal forms which were 
handed to students. ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 25–26. 
 193. See Hyman, supra note 12, at 685–86. 
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that the students were ―constructively‖ discharged, as courts have 
recognized similar claims in the employment law context.
194
 This defense 
should be even more persuasive in the educational context, where school 
attendance is required until a certain age and administrators have greater 
authority over students than employers over employees. 
D. Crafting Effective Remedies 
Though local and state educational schemes are often complex and 
courts are often reluctant to order or enforce far-reaching educational 
remedies,
195
 in light of the continued failure of New York City schools to 
adequately remedy the pushout problem,
 196
 any court-ordered or approved 
remedies must be more targeted and include better remedial oversight. The 
settlement of the litigation involving Boys and Girls High offers some 
promising solutions.
197
 In addition to injunctive relief directing procedural 
protections for future students, the settlement includes provisions for 
monitoring by both the plaintiffs‘ counsel and by an outside monitor, and 
compensatory provisions to provide supplemental and remedial services 
and extended public education eligibility for the pushed-out students.
198
 
Thus, the substantive component of remedies and settlements should 
 
 
 194. In suits for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, constructive discharge acts ―as a 
defense against an employer‘s contention that the employee quit voluntarily.‖ Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist. 
of Brown Deer, 2000 WI 97, ¶ 69, 237 Wis. 2d 19, ¶ 69, 614 N.W.2d 443, ¶ 69. The Supreme Court 
has also recognized constructive discharge in the context of National Labor Relations Act violations. 
See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 894 (1984). Federal courts have also recognized this 
defense in discrimination actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Strozinsky, 2000 WI 
97, ¶ 70. Though the standard here would need to be different than in the employment context, which 
requires showing that the employer ―purposefully creates working conditions so intolerable that the 
employee has no option but to resign,‖ Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 894, the same idea of coercive behavior 
by authority figures seeking to avoid liability by portraying the employee or student as acting of their 
own full volition applies. 
 195. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973) (noting that the 
Court‘s ―lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference with 
the informed judgments made at the state and local levels,‖ and because of the ―very complexity of the 
problems of financing and managing a statewide public school system . . . ‗the legislature‘s efforts to 
tackle the problems‘ should be entitled to respect.‖). 
 196. See supra note 74 and accompanying text; see also Jake Mooney, A Second Chance for 
Students Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2008, at CY1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ 
11/30/nyregion/thecity/30disp.html?_r=1 (describing the story of one student, Darrius Spann, who 
after being suspended, returned to school to find his schedule had been reduced to five periods. After 
that, it was reduced to three periods, before Darius ―was assigned to sit in an auditorium with about 
100 other students from 7:30 to 10:30 each morning, filling out school worksheets before going 
home.‖ After this he was transferred to an alternative education center and after being refused re-
admittance to Boys & Girls, he dropped out.). 
 197. See D.S. ex rel S.S. v. N.Y. City Dep‘t of Educ., 255 F.R.D. 59, 68–70 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 198. Id. 
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include extensive compensatory opportunities for the actual excluded 
students, supplemental education services for the under-credited and 
overage students that are most vulnerable to future pushouts, and 
monitored procedural protections targeted at the underlying failures of due 
process and oversight. The monitoring component is particularly 
important, as lack of oversight is a large source of the pushout problem in 
the first place. Thus, either court-ordered remedies or settlements should 
include the appointment of a special master or other monitor.
199
 Beyond 
their monitoring role, the special master likely will have expertise into the 
relevant educational issues and thus can serve as a qualified independent 
advisor.
200
 Further, appointing special masters allows courts to consider 
and enforce detailed and even ―experimentalist remedies‖ while avoiding 
―comprehensive sets of regulatory instructions,‖ or ―judicial 
micromanagement.‖201  
E. Improving Data Compilation to Account for Pushouts  
In addition to the legal strategies noted, solving the pushout problem 
requires accurate data. The problem itself is primarily a function of 
inconsistent data collection methods across school districts and states, and 
methods that are not reliable in tracking what happens to students who 
leave the regular educational setting.
202
 Lawsuits against pushouts cannot 
succeed without the documentation of their occurrence. Better 
documentation in itself should serve as an effective oversight technique, 
and discourage the practice. The Education Trust and other experts 
recommend taking this on at a federal level, by amending NCLB to require 
each state to establish ―longitudinal data systems‖ that would include a 
―unique, statewide student identifier,‖ and maintain ―[s]tudent-level 
enrollment, demographic, and program participation information,‖ among 
other things.
203
 A centrally administered data system as described would 
 
 
 199. ―Nowhere is the need for special masters more obvious, though, than in the context of 
institutional reform litigation, specifically during its remedial stages.‖ James S. DeGraw, Note, Rule 
53, Inherent Powers, and Institutional Reform: The Lack of Limits on Special Masters, 66 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 800, 801 (1991). The type of remedy that would need enforcement and oversight in a class-based 
school pushout case would certainly involve some ―institutional reform‖ of the relevant school system. 
 200. For example, the independent monitor appointed in the Boys and Girls High School case is 
John M. Verre, who as Co-Director of the Harvard Institute on Critical Issues in Urban Special 
Education, is a well-qualified expert in the relevant areas. See D.S., 255 F.R.D. at 69. 
 201. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 17, at 1025. 
 202. See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying test (describing the confused student data reporting 
procedures in New York and Los Angeles which cause students to be misclassified and lost in the 
system.). 
 203. Policy Memorandum, The Educ. Trust, Education Trust Recommendations for No Child Left 
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make it more difficult for administrators to push students out by ―losing 
them in the system‖ like the students described in Los Angeles,204 or 
writing them into a vague category drawn up by a particular school system 
as in New York.
205
 Further, school districts must not only delineate 
procedures that make excluding or exiting a student from the path to 
graduation difficult, it must provide training to administrators in its 
implementation, and provide oversight to ensure that the procedures are 
actually being followed. As the recent pushout update released by AFC 
shows,
206
 even when a school district has agreed to procedural changes, 
they will not be effective without real oversight. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The importance of pursuing pushout litigation cannot be overstated. 
While the ultimate solutions to this syndrome in public education must 
come from all angles, including national, state and local policy changes, 
litigation can provide more immediate remedies for excluded students as 
well as garnering public attention and spurring policy-makers to action. As 
Judge Weinstein noted in 2004, ―[w]hile the instant litigations' total impact 
is relatively small in a City public school student body of some one 
million students, its principles—acknowledged by the City—set a standard 
for the entire system.‖207 
Davin Rosborough  
 
 
Behind Reauthorization 1, available at http://www2.edtrust.org/NR/rdonlyres/5A150FED-85FD-4535-
8DF6-737A536EB0FB/0/EdTrustNCLBRecommendations41607.pdf; see also Losen, supra note 45, 
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